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Rating model opportunities for emerging markets 
Alexander Karminsky * 
 
Ratings are in high demand in market-driven economies. The Basel II Accords have sparked 
increased interest in the development of approaches based on internal ratings systems. They 
have initiated the elaboration of models for remote ratings forecast based on external ones 
as part of Risk Management Systems and Early Warning Systems. 
This article evaluates peculiarities of current ratings systems and specific issues of 
development of econometrical rating models (order probit) for emerging market companies. 
Financial indicators, market-value appraisals and macroeconomic indicators of different 
countries are used as explanatory variables. Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s ratings are 
considered as modeling ratings. The sample was based on data from an information agency 
as well as the rating agencies, and related to companies from almost 40 countries. 
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1. Introduction 
Ratings are in high demand in market-driven economies. As a business, the rating 
process has a moral component, since the agency does not bear legal responsibility 
for its conclusions. Its reputational capital serves as a regulatory element however 
(Partnoy 2002). In addition to independent appraisals of investment risk in the form 
of the rating agency’s opinion, ratings also function as licensing of a sort. 
The Basel II Accords (Basel 2004) have sparked increased interest in ratings 
and their models. The development of approaches based on internal ratings systems 
holds a practical interest, especially for developing markets. The topic has received 
increased attention in connection with the global recession that began in 2007.  
In this work, an analysis is made of the possibilities for rating modeling as 
applied to industrial companies and banks of developing countries (according 
JP Morgan classification). Emphasis is placed on the elaboration of econometric 
models. As explanatory variables, financial indicators, which characterize the 
activities of a company, are incorporated. Market indicators are used to reflect the 
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dynamics of stock quotations, and macroeconomic variables and dummies of 
industrial and country affiliations are also used.  
Ratings of Moody’s Investors Service and Standard & Poor’s agencies are 
considered as modeling ratings, which also allows an evaluation of the specific 
approaches of each of those agencies to be made. Samples were made up of data 
from those agencies and the Bloomberg information agency.  
Analysis of the predictive power of the derived econometric models allows an 
appraisal of their remote use in risk management systems to be made. Particular 
attention is given to variables in ratings of companies in accordance with their 
affiliations with developing countries or with particular industries. 
It is demonstrated that the ratings companies and banks from developing 
countries with the same financial indicators have significantly lower ratings than 
those in developed countries (“advanced economy” by new IMF understanding). It 
is also shown that industry affiliation influences ratings. 
The work consists of six sections. The second section addresses the 
particularities of ratings as a measurement of risk in Russia and the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe. Section 3 includes an overview of different approaches 
to rating modeling. In Section 4, there is an examination of the types of models used 
and the formation and statistical characteristics of the samples.  
Models of corporate ratings and bank ratings relating to developing markets 
and a comparison of the ratings of Moody’s and S&P are systematized in Sections 5. 
Conclusions are presented in the final section. 
2. Development of ratings services in developing countries  
As an example of the ratings system using, we may consider the ratings in Russia 
where they are rather particular. We may observe several waves of interest in these 
possibilities.  
 At the initial stage of the establishment of market relations, ratings in Russia 
were predominantly used for banks. The entry of the international rating agencies 
and the ratings they made in Russia (beginning in 1996) had little impact before the 
1998 financial crisis and immediately after it.  
 The opportunities for foreign borrowings, including by industrial companies 
and corporations, beginning in 2003, gave impetus to their development. The 
number of ratable entities in Russia has more than tripled since then, reaching more 
than 300 at the beginning of 2009. (About half of them are banks and more than a 
third are companies.) The process was encouraged when Russia received 
investment-level ratings in 2005-2006.  
 The recession of 2008-2009 has had an effect on the rating process. In 
particular, a number of ratings were withdrawn. Russia’s sovereign ratings were 
lowered by Standard & Poor’s and Fitch Ratings by one grade, although ratings 
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remained on the investment level at BBB. The insignificant lowering of the 
sovereign ratings did not dampen interest in them from economically active entities, 
as happened in 1998.   
 A large portion of the bank ratings was assigned by Moody’s Investors 
Service (hereinafter, “Moody’s”), the Standard & Poor’s agency (hereinafter “S&P”) 
leads in ratings of industrial companies and their financial instruments. The 
distribution of international agencies’ corporate ratings by grades shows that the 
level of ratings of Russian companies is comparatively low. Less than 20 companies 
have investment-level ratings. The average level of ratings is between BB- and BB 
for all three agencies, while the average level for S&P is almost BB- and for 
Moody’s, it is Ba2, which is equivalent to BB. For the Fitch Ratings agency, the 
average level is between these grades.  
 The ratings of banks and industrial companies in Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE) have much in common as they concern developing countries. The level of 
development of these countries lags considerably behind that of the original 
members of the European Community. However, these countries were oriented 
toward membership in the EU, and many of them have become members of EU.  
Data analysis shows (Fig.1) that the sovereign ratings of the countries of the CEE 
are in the lower part of the investment range (A and lower), with the exception of the 
higher ratings of Slovakia, the Czech Republic (A+) and especially Slovenia (AA). 
Serbia, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have noninvestment ratings.  





AA A BBB BB B
Moody's S&P Fitch  
Source: own creation 
 
At the same time, companies and banks mainly have ratings on the speculative level, 
and the number of rated entities is not high (Fig. 2). This is largely explained by 
European Union support for these countries, although that support has been limited 




countries and the existing ones happen to be subsidiaries of transnational companies. 
This may potentially lower the level of the ratings, since their market capitalization 
(or volume of assets) is one of the main explanatory variables for them. 
Thus, in spite of higher sovereign ratings, company ratings in these countries are on 
the level of Russian companies, being predominantly in the upper range of 
uninvestment ratings. 
 





Aa A Baa Ba B Caa
CEE BRIC CIS  
Source: own creation 
 
In spite of the comparative growth in the number of ratings, there are still clearly too 
few of them in developing countries. In addition, rating methods are largely 
inexplicit, and expertise plays a significant role in them which hinders the use of 
ratings for risk evaluation and decision making even on the state level. This is the 
reason for interest in the creation of internal ratings and model ratings that can be 
used as preliminary evaluations in making management decisions.  
3. Overview of the literature and particulars of the methodology  
Changes in ratings play an important role in transactions with interest-rate risks. In 
spite of a certain decrease in the normative significance of ratings, their presence 
and popularity have grown since the mid-1970s (Partnoy 2002). That is due largely 
to the regulatory significance of ratings, in addition to their market significance 
(Karminsky-Peresetsky 2009).  
 Although the initial application of ratings was to debt obligations, corporate 
ratings are now steadily gaining significance (Altman and Suggitt, 2000) for the 
organization of syndicated credits, the rating of corporate bonds and other purposes 
(Altman-Saunders 1998; Servigny-Renault 2004; Partnoy 2002).  
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The recession has exacerbated the problem of ratings. A number of researchers have 
shown (Altman-Rijken 2004; Pederzoli-Torricelli 2005; Curry et al. 2008) that 
ratings are pro-cyclical. There is a certain lag between the recording of financial 
results and the changing of a rating. While this creates stability in the rating process 
and averts reactions to comparatively insignificant events, it does not always provide 
for a timely reaction by ratings agencies to significant events. The widely-discussed 
collapse of several major companies is an example of this (Servigny-Renault 2004).  
 At the same time as (Amato-Furfine 2004) demonstrated based on the 
activities of U.S. firms and the data of the S&P rating agency between 1980 and 
2000, credit ratings rise less during times of recession. However, ratings do not 
display excessive sensitivity to business cycles. Without discounting this factor, 
especially for new financial instruments (at present predominantly structured 
transactions), it should be noted that degradation can be connected with the 
dynamics of the market as a whole. With regards to banks, the absence of such 
degradation during the transition to ordinal scales was shown in (Karminsky-
Peresetsky 2007).    
 The reason for the relative volatility of ratings is the specifics of the 
assignment of country ratings, especially for developing countries, considering the 
specifics of their reexamination and the modification of the rating agencies’ 
methodology (Moody’s 2007). In (Kaminsky-Schmucler 2002; Reinhart 2002), it is 
shown that there are three possible channels of instability that arise from changes to 
a country rating during a recession:  
- directly through the value of debt obligations and stock on the 
market, 
- through contagion and generated global unstability, 
- due to markets in countries with lower ratings because of their 
greater liability to fluctuations. 
 In (Reinhart 2002), it is also shown that changes in sovereign ratings 
influence the spread and income of bonds, complicate access to resources of 
developing markets, hastens the transition from currency crisis to banking crisis and 
can act on recession. Some of the specifics of the rating process during crisis, 
including its effects on developing countries, are also examined in (Joo and Pruitt, 
2006). Significant attention has been given to an analysis of indicators of financial 
and banking crises, especially with regards to developing countries (Kaminsky-
Schmucler 2002; Rojas-Suarez 2002). 
 Evaluating sufficiency of capital as a measurement of risk based on internal 
ratings, as is foreseen by the IRB approach put forward as part of Basel II (Basel 
2004), can use probability of default as a model as well as ratings. It can also use an 
evaluation of transition matrices and the mechanism of Markov chains (Frydman-
Schuermann 2008) or econometric models, including scoring (Altman-Saunders 




A number of articles have been devoted to the elaboration of internal ratings and 
early warning systems. An overview of methodological specifics of elaborating 
models is made in (Altman-Saunders 1998; Karminsky et al. 2005).  
 In (Carey-Hrycay 2001), specifics are examined of the joint use of several 
methods for the evaluation of the probability of default on debt instruments 
according to an internal rating scale. Mapping to a standardized scale and scoring 
models are used. The presence of a data series of long duration is critical. A number 
of the specifics of the elaboration of internal ratings systems are also examined in 
(Jacobson et al. 2006; Servigny-Renault 2004; Hanson-Schuermann 2006). In the 
last of these articles, the confidence interval technique is used to refine rating 
gradation.  
 Selection of the explanatory variables is methodologically important for the 
elaboration of corporate ratings models. The indicators that are employed by the 
rating agencies can be also used (Moody’s 2009; S&P 2008) by other researchers 
(Rojas-Suarez 2002; Servigny-Renault 2004; Guttler-Wahrenburg 2007; Curry et al. 
2008). Typical indicators are the size of the company, its profitability, stability, 
liquidity and structure of the business, as it is expressed through companies’ 
balance-sheet figures. In recent years, the use of such factors as state support for 
companies, and support from the parent company or group of companies, has 
become more prominent (Moody’s, 2007; S&P, 2009). 
 The use of macroeconomic indicators has also become more typical recently 
(Carling et al. 2007; Curry et al. 2008; Peresetsky-Karminsky 2008). Among the 
most common indicators are inflation index, real GDP growth, industrial production 
growth and, for export-oriented countries, oil prices and changes in the cross-rate of 
currencies. Separate mention should be made of market indicators (Curry et al. 
2008), which is especially important for publicly held companies (market value of 
companies, volatility of stock prices, systemic parameters, etc.).  
 It should also be noted that alternate indicators can also be used for 
developing countries (Altman 2005; Rojas-Suarez 2002; Karminsky et al. 2005) that 
are characteristic of developing markets and predominantly uninvestment ratings. 
These include value of resources, percent margin, pace of asset growth and growth 
of interbank debt, including on an international level. 
 Variation over time, both of the dimensions of the risk and the approaches of 
the rating agencies points to the use of a time factor in models including that of 
panel data. Some of the specifics of these approaches are found in (Elton et al. 2004; 
Frydman-Schuermann 2008).   
 The particular significance of industry affiliation and possible differences 
among ratings of companies of varied profiles and regions can be noted for 
corporate ratings (Niemann et al. 2008). This is connected with the specifics of 
business in various segments of production activity. Industry-specific models and 
the use of fictitious variables depending on the industry and the location of 
companies are possible.  
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A number of articles have noted differences in the ratings of various agencies 
(Packer 2002; Bae-Klein 1997; Kish et al. 1999). Corresponding factors of national 
and international agencies were analyzed in these works. In practically all the 
research, the two main rating agencies, Moody’s and S&P, were considered.  
 The global financial recession exposed a number of problems of the ratings 
business and the entire financial management system. The financial system grew 
markedly in the first decade of the 2
nd
 millenium (IMF 2009). New financial 
instruments were created, designed for higher profit without adequate quality of risk 
management. However, the inability of both regulatory organs and rating agencies to 
evaluate the global outlook and the threat from the asset price bubble. 
Faith in light regulation based on the discipline of the financial market and hope for 
the successful distribution of risk through financial innovation does not preclude 
their concentration. An IMF analysis shows problems on three levels:  
- Financial regulatory and monitoring organs proved to be incapable 
of exposing the higher concentration of risk brought on by the rapid growth 
in financial innovation. 
- No account was taken of growing macroeconomic imbalances that 
contributed to the growth of systemic risk in the financial system and real 
estate market, as well as in the shadow financial system. 
- International financial organizations and the monitoring and control 
system that was in place were unable to cooperate reliably on the 
international level to identify vulnerable areas in transnational relations.  
 Heightened possibilities of infection during the liquidity deficit are noted in 
(Karas et al. 2008) in regard to the Russian banking stystem and developing markets. 
It is shown there that regulating the liquidity of individual banks is not sufficient to 
avoid a systemic crisis. Rather, resource management by the lender of the last resort 
is necessary to restore the coordination of the interbank market.   
 The crisis emphasized the need for clearer signals in economic policy and the 
development of international cooperation on a number of economic and financial 
questions, including ratings. Among the steps suggested was taking leadership in 
responsive measures to systemic global risk. Establishing an early warning system 
should be included as one of these preventive steps.  
 Development and regulation of early warning systems require improved 
independent evaluation. Rating agencies should also be employed for this purpose. 
Policy has to be coordinated in various areas. Some of the elements included in these 
should be: supervision of the rating agencies, bookkeeping practice and auditing. 
Those initiatives should be coordinated both within a country and on the 
international level (IMF 2009).  
 Among the problems that arise in connection with the financial crisis, rating 
agencies’ lag in the methodology of assigning ratings can be pointed out, along with 




evaluation of complex financial instruments. A more active role of agencies in 
developing methodology, including areas emphasized by the Basel committee, can 
be noted (Basel 2009).  
4. Data and models 
4.1. Models and rating scales 
Multiple choice probit models are used for follow-up studies. Earlier, they had been 
used for the elaboration of bank rating models. Further, three numerical scales are 
used. They correspond to the classes of ratings and gradations of ratings and a mixed 
scale that is tied to the limitations on the volume of the sample. The mapping of 
these scales to the numerical scales has 8, 18 and 12 levels, respectively. A higher 
rating corresponds to a lower number.  
4.2. The Sample: financial and market variables, macrovariables and ratings 
To elaborate ratings models for industrial enterprises, a sample was made on the 
principle of affiliation with companies in a number of industries (oil and gas, metals, 
retail trade, energy, telecommunications and heavy industry) that are potential 
competitors of Russian production companies of the same profile. 
 Conditions for selection in the sample were: the presence of an S&P rating at 
the time the sample was made, affiliation with a selected industry, accessibility of 
financial data and market indicators, and tradability as indicated by a liquid market 
for the company’s stock. In the sample, there were 215 companies from 39 countries 
with S&P ratings as of spring, 2008. 
 The sovereign and corporate credit ratings of companies were taken from the 
websites of the S&P and Moody’s agencies as they were presented as of February, 
2009. Financial and market indicators were taken from the Bloomberg information 
system. A minimum of one financial indicator is assumed in each of the following 
groups: market valuation, size, profitability, market risks, balance-sheet and cash 
flow.   
 Distribution of the companies represented in the sample by rating gradation as 
of spring, 2008 is presented in Fig. 3. The small number of companies with ratings 
in categories AAA, AA and B justify the use of the mixed scale with differentiation 
of gradation in classes’ А to В.  
 More than half the companies were represented by five countries: U.S. (74), 
Russia (31), Canada (15), Great Britain (13) and Japan (10). Division of the 
countries into developed or developing economies was done according to the 
methodology of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The sample contains a 
greater number of companies from developed countries (152) than from developing 
ones (63).  















































Source: own creation 
 
The time lag between financial indicators and ratings was determined to be 1.5 years 
(financial indicators were taken from autumn, 2007 and ratings from the beginning 
of 2009). This agrees with the conclusions reached in (Karminsky-Peresetsky 2007) 
for bank ratings, and with a number of other articles, such as (Altman-Rijken 2004). 
Financial and market data for only one accounting period can be considered a flaw 
in the sample.  
 The sample of banks included (Peresetsky-Karminsky 2008) about 1000 
observations in 2002-2005 of 380 banks in 42 developing and developed countries. 
The distribution of the sample by gradation and region, and the statistical 
distinctions of the sample may be found in the work indicated. The sample included 
37 banks from CEE. 
4.3. Explanatory variables and descriptive statistics 
The lists of the main financial and market indicators used for the elaboration of the 
rating models, as well as a description of them and their expected influence on the 
ratings of industrial companies and banks are partly presented in Tables 1. 
Supplemental indicators have been used in a number of models as described in the 
text. According to the Bloomberg, market risks correspond to the Beta coefficient 
and Volatility.  
 Country distinctions will be calculated with macrovariables: annual rate of 
inflation, real GDP growth, CPI (Corruption Perception Index), and sovereign 
rating, which can be seen as a proxy for the institutional environment in which a 
company works. The first two indicators were taken from World Bank 2007 data, 
the corruption index comes from Transparency International, and sovereign ratings 




level of corruption are negative. The remaining indicators are positive. Higher CPI 
corresponds to lower corruption.  This indicator with other macrovariables may be 
used as explonatory variables instead of sovereign rating.  
A number of dummies will also be used in the models. The relationship of a 
company to a country with a developed economy (1- developed, 0- developing) and 
Russia were introduced for the analysis of the influence of affiliation to the groups 
on the level of the rating. Companies’ liability to risk in dependence of their 
affiliation with various industries will be traced through the introduction of dummies 
affiliated with the following sectors: telecommunication, oil and gas, metal and 
mining, consumer, utilities, and manufacturing and chemicals. 
The variables used in the models will be commented on in the analysis of the 
resulting tables.  
5. Econometric rating models  
5.1. Models of corporate ratings  
The models examined in this work depend exclusively on open information. 
Accordingly, we will examine the possibilities derived from the use of indicators 
based on company financial accounts prepared to international standards and 
supplemental possibilities provided by macroeconomic variables and market 
elements. 
 Among the questions that we face in elaborating rating models, we 
emphasized the following: 
- Do the ratings of enterprises depend on their affiliation with a group 
of countries (developing countries, Russia)?  
- Do ratings depend on affiliation with an industry? 
- Is it possible to incorporate a high enough level of information in 
sovereign ratings using macrovariables?  
 In the elaboration of the base rating model for the Standard & Poor’s agency, 
indicators were chosen from each group of financial indicators. The indicator of size 
of the company was included in all models. Below (in logarithmic scale), 
capitalization of the company is taken as the same. As criteria for comparison at the 
first stage, statistical characteristics of the quality of the models (Pseudo-R
2
, t-
statistics) were used, to which predictive characteristics were added at the next 
stage.   
 Coefficient signs match prior expectations. As one of the areas for the 
improvement of the quality of the model, transition to a scale of gradations or a 
mixed scale may be considered. This will ensure the models are more accurate. 
Relevant models are presented in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Models of ratings on scales of gradations and a mixed scale 
 S&P S&P, market Moody’s 
Scale Grades Mixed Grades Mixed Mixed 
Volatility of value     0.022***  0.068***  
   (0.0060) (0.011)  
Share value/   -0.015** -0.26***  
        Cash flow   (0.0075) (0.0078)  
Capitalization  -0.517*** -0.509*** -0.528*** -0.588*** -0.502*** 
        (logarithm) (0.151) (0.153) (0.154) (0.158) (0.158) 
EBITDA/Interest  -0.0062* -0.0062* -0.0089*** -0.0086*** -0.017** 
        expenses (0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0070) 
Return on assets -0.035*** -0.033** -0.042*** -0.041*** -0.032** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) 
Long-term debt/ -0.012* -0.012**    0.0095* 
       Capital (0.0045) (0.0047)   (0.0049) 
Inflation level  0.379***  0.391***  0.443***  0.561***  0.345*** 
 (0.063) (0.065) (0.070) (0.077) (0.069) 
GDP growth -0.186*** -0.184*** -0.185*** -0.252*** -0.96 
 (0.060) (0.060) (0.185) (0.053) (0.076) 
Metal and mining   -0.456* -0.835***  
   (0.258) (0.270)  
Oil and gas -0.619*** -0.625*** -0.866*** -0.954*** -0.413* 
 (0.197) (0.198) (0.212) (0.215) (0.228) 
Utilities -1.217*** -1.223*** -1.127*** -0.973*** -1.403*** 
 (0.0224) (0.0225) (0.234) (0.238) (0.243) 
Developed countries -0.636** -0.611**   0.086 
 (0.308) (0.310)   (0.355) 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.159 0.169 0.166 0.219 0.148 
Accuracy of forecast  34 31 35 39 33 
Error up to 1 grades  52 57 51 50 57 
Error up to 2 grades  14 12 13 10 9 
*, **, *** signify 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level of significance, respectively. 
Source: own creation 
 
For models using market indicators, as before, volatility of a company’s share value 
exerted a negative influence. The influence of the ratio of share value to cash flow is 
positive. Among the balance indicators, size of the company (capitalization) retains 
its positive influence, as do probability of loan repayment with earnings and return 
on assets. The influence of the long-term debt as ratio to capital is also positive, but 
the sign in the model was due to the rather high negative correlation of this variable 




The inclusion of macroeconomic indicators and consideration of the factors of 
industry and country affiliation raise the quality of the base model. The influence of 
macroeconomic factors on the rating is expected: negative for inflation and positive 
for the GDP growth indicator, which determines the level of stability of the external 
business environment. Developing countries dummy is among the explanatory 
variables and have positive influence. 
 Affiliation with developed countries in our research was not obviously a 
positive factor, which, of course, is connected with the correlation present between 
this element and the macroenvironment indicator. Russian companies are not 
significantly distinguishable from companies in other developing countries.  
Among industries, the positive influence on the rating of affiliation with the oil and 
gas or utilities industries can be noted. Moreover, an analysis of average deviations 
shows that that tendency was stable.  
 The use of a stock market indicator (the S&P market model) is  raising of the 
quality of the models for publicly-traded companies, that is, those with market 
quotations. In particular, there were in our distribution indicators of value volatility, 
level of systemic risk, ratio of share value to cash flow and a number of others, as 
well as an indicator of market discipline in the country where the company is 
located.  
 Systemic risk was insignificant in practically all the models examined. 
Volatility of value negatively influenced the level of the rating. Growth of share 
value in relation to cash flow has a positive influence on the rating. The positive 
influence of capitalization, the ratio of gross earnings to interest expenses and return 
on assets is preserved, as is the influence of macroeconomic indicators.  
 An analysis of the predictive power of the models was conducted by making a 
comparison of the true ratings of enterprises with their model values. The accuracy 
of the forecasts was approximately equal for the models examined. Accuracy of 
forecasts with an error of 1 gradation was about 90% and the accuracy of forecast 
was 39% and 33%, respectively. The accuracy of forecast with an error of no more 
than 2 gradations was higher than 99%, which is better than for models in the scale 
of classes.  
5.2. Rating models for banks 
Modeling ratings of financial stability for banks (bank financial strength rating, 
BFSR) depends on the same scheme. Selection of explanatory variables is made by 
both statistical and predictive criteria. The results of the appraisal of various models 
for choosing a bank profitability indicator are presented in (Peresetsky-Karminsky 
2008). Unlike models for rating bank deposits, BFSR is not grouped in classes, but 
presented in grades.  
 A logarithm of assets is used as a variable to characterize the size of the bank. 
The debt-to-equety ratio characterizes the adequacy of the capital. The share of 
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overdue credits was chosen as a proxy for quality of assets. That variable has 
practically no correlation with other indicators except the provision for impairment 
of loans. 
 The following conclusions can be drawn from an analysis of the signs of the 
coefficients:  
- Banks located in developing countries have a lower BFSR than 
banks in developed countries, and Russian banks are undervalued even in 
relation to banks in developing countries.  
- The volume of assets influences the BFSR positively.  
- Parameters reflecting efficiency (ratio of personnel expenses to 
operating income), the quality of assets (ratio of overdue debt to all debt) and 
ratio of client funds to own capital are significant; growth of personnel 
expenses and the portion of bad debts or financial leveraging have a negative 
influence on BFSR.  
- The ratio of interest expenses to interest income and return on 
assets yielding interest income are indicators of profitability; net interest 
margin has the expected signs that reflect the fact that growth of profitability 
indicators encourages stability.  
 It should especially be noted that the coefficient before the value of interest 
liabilities is positive, which means that banks that pay more to obtain funds have a 
lower BFSR indicator. This conclusion coincides with a previous analysis 
(Karminsky-Peresetsky 2007). It is the value of resources that to a large extent 
determines the level of stability and efficiency of banks’ activities.  
 The forecast of ratings based on the financial results of Russian banks in 
2005, which were not used for the elaboration of the model, gave an exact forecast 
on the level of 56% and over 90% with 1 grade error scope.  
 The significance of the developing markets dummy should also be brought to 
attention, as well as differences in evaluations of Russian banks in comparison with 
banks of developing markets. This indicates the potential for Russian banks’ ratings 
growth because of both the rise of the level of evaluation of business in Russia as a 
whole and the rise of the quality of the operating and regulatory environments, 
which have been a substantial hindrance to the rice of the evaluation of Russian 
banks and industrial companies. Such improvements were partially implemented in 
2005-2008.   
5.3.  Comparative analysis of the corporate ratings of the two agencies  
We also made a statistical comparison of the ratings of the S&P and Moody’s 
agencies. We used a subsample containing observations of companies that have 





Three measures of difference were used for the comparison:  
∆ - the difference between S&P and Moody’s ratings, 
FDS = ∆ - the difference module, 
SPLIT - a binary function that takes the value of 0 when the ratings coincide 
and 1 otherwise.  
For each measure, we elaborated econometric models to determine the factors that 
significantly influence agencies’ opinions. The results of the comparison are 
presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Comparison of the ratings of the S&P and Moody’s agencies 
Model number   
Difference  ∆ Difference module  SPLIT  
 1d 2d 1a 2a 1s 
Return on assets 0.028** 0.022*    
 (0.011) (0.011)    
Instant liquidity -0.462*** -0.507***    
 (0.140) (0.150)    
Fixed assets/Assets  -0.924**    
  (0.383)    
Share value/  -0.0098    
       Cash flow  (0.0073)    
Value volatility   -0.007* -0.006 -0.0038* 
   (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0023) 
Inflation level -0.221*** -0.156***    
 (0.056) (0.060)    
Corruption index -0.303*** -0.305*** -0.81   
 (0.060) (0.058) (0.053)   
Consumer sector -0.857*** -1.084*** -0.169   
 (0.284) (0.288) (0.216)   
Developed countries    -0.572** -0.838*** -0.309*** 
   (0.237) (0.163) (0.086) 
Russia   -0.649*** -0.098  
   (0.243) (0.341)  
Other insignificant    +  
    Pseudo-R
2
 0.182 0.217 0.127 0.140 0.061 
*, **, *** signify 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level of significance, respectively. 
Source: own creation 
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The following conclusions can be drawn from this analysis of the table: 
1. The most substantial differences are in the rating of companies from 
developing countries, which is expressed either directly through the 
dummy or indirectly as the influence of corruption.  
2. Among the most significant and positive factors influencing the ratings of 
the Moody’s agency, return on assets can be pointed out. For the S&P, 
factors such as instant liquidity, share of fixed assets in assets, level of 
inflation and corruption were more significant.  
3. No substantial difference in the ratings of Russian companies was 
uncovered except indication of the large differences in the ratings on both 
the positive and negative sides (model 1а).  
4. Growth of the volatility of companies’ share value creates multidirectional 
differences, although not at a very high level of significance – 10% 
(models 1а and 1s). That indirectly confirms the previous conclusion. 
5. The S&P agency takes a more critical stance toward companies from the 
consumer sector (models 1d and 2d). On average, the divergence between 
the agencies’ ratings, expressed as their difference of the ratings, was 0.26 
grades for our sample and is characterized by the bar chart in Fig. 4. 
 
Fig. 4. Sample distribution of the difference between the ratings of the  
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Probability evaluations based on econometric models should be an integral part of 
internal rating systems, which determines the potential practical significance of such 
models, especially in developing countries. In this article, rating models of corporate 
ratings were elaborated based on multiple choice models. Financial indicators of 
corporations, dummies of regional and industry affiliation, market and 
macroeconomic indicators were used as explanatory variables.  
It was shown that: 
- A set of explanatory financial indicators is sufficient and are 
interpreted well to rating models. 
- When other conditions are equal, industrial companies in 
developing countries receive lower ratings in comparison with companies in 
developed countries. 
- The predictive power of corporate ratings models is somewhat 
better than bank deposit rating models. 
- The degree of influence of country affiliation, return on assets, 
instant liquidity and inflation level are prominent factors that differentiate the 
approaches of the two agencies.  
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